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The Bungling of Justice Nadon’s
Appointment to the
Supreme Court of Canada
Hugo Cyr*

I. INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 2013, the Honourable Justice Morris Fish wrote to the
then Minister of Justice, the Honourable Robert Nicholson, to advise that
he would retire from the Supreme Court of Canada and that his
retirement would be effective August 31, 2013, a mere three months
before he reached the mandatory retirement age.1 Despite four months’
notice, the federal government waited until the last minute to appoint a
replacement. Indeed, just a week before the Fall term hearings were to
begin at the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister announced on September 30
that Justice Marc Nadon, a supernumerary judge of the Federal Court of
Appeal, was his “nominee”.2 Justice Nadon had been a member of the
Quebec bar from 1973 to 1993, practising mainly maritime law up until
his appointment to the Federal Court, six months prior to the entry into
force of the Civil Code of Québec in 1994.3
This rushed announcement came as a surprise because not long
before, in mid-August, the Minister of Justice publicly recognized that
there might be some problems in appointing a judge currently sitting on
the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court.
In an interview published in the National Post, the Minister declared that

*

Full Professor, Faculté de science politique et de droit, Université du Québec à Montréal
(UQAM), and member of the Quebec Bar.
1
Supreme Court, News Release (April 22, 2013), online: <http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/
news/en/item/4282/index.do>. Justice Morris Fish was born on November 16, 1938. See Supreme Court of
Canada, online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx?id=morris-j-fish>.
2
Press Release: “Prime Minister Announces Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada”,
September 30, 2013, online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/09/30/pm-announces-nominee-supremecourt-canada>.
3
CCQ-1991.
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the Supreme Court Act 4 needed to be updated because “[t]here are
provisions right now that could be interpreted as excluding federal
judges from Supreme Court appointments …”. 5 The fear that such an
appointment might not be legally valid was quite real within the
Justice Department. At least, it was real enough that it moved the
Minister to seek legal opinions from two retired Supreme Court
judges. According to answers given by the government to order
papers in the House of Commons, 6 an initial opinion was sought from
retired Supreme Court Justice Louise Charron, who only gave
an oral opinion7 — the content of which is not publicly available.
Retired Supreme Court Justice Ian C. Binnie was later asked for a
written opinion, which is dated September 9, 2013. 8 That opinion
predominantly examined whether or not a Federal Court judge could
be appointed to the Supreme Court in light of section 5 of the
Supreme Court Act 9 and concluded that the same rule applied proprio
motu to section 6, dealing with the three seats reserved for judges
from Quebec. The relevant sections read:
Who may be appointed judges

Conditions de nomination

5. Any
person
may
be
appointed a judge who is or has
been a judge of a superior court
of a province or a barrister or
advocate of at least ten years
standing at the bar of a
province.

5. Les juges sont choisis parmi
les juges, actuels ou anciens,
d’une cour supérieure provinciale
et parmi les avocats inscrits
pendant au moins dix ans au
barreau d’une province.

4

R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
Tobi Cohen, “Peter MacKay insists Conservatives are not moving Canada toward U.S.-style
justice”, National Post, August 17, 2013, online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/08/17/petermackay-insists-conservatives-are-not-moving-canada-toward-u-s-style-justice/>.
6
Order/Address of the House of Commons, Q-437, questions by Irwin Cotler, (Mount Royal),
April 1, 2014, answers by Tom Lukiwski, May 26, 2014 [hereinafter “Order Paper, Q-437”].
7
Id., answer (ii).
8
Ian C. Binnie, “Re: Eligibility of Federal Court Judges for Appointment to the Supreme
Court of Canada”, legal opinion, September 9, 2013, online: <http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/20130930_
Binnie_cp.pdf>
9
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
5
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Three judges from Quebec

Représentation du Québec

6. At least three of the judges
shall be appointed from among
the judges of the Court of
Appeal or of the Superior Court
of the Province of Quebec or
from among the advocates of
that Province.10

6. Au moins trois des juges sont
choisis parmi les juges de la Cour
d’appel ou de la Cour supérieure
de la province de Québec ou
parmi les avocats de celle-ci.
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Still unsure, the Justice Department sought the opinion of
constitutional law expert Peter Hogg on Justice Binnie’s analysis.11 The
Honourable Louise Charron was also asked to comment on Justice
Binnie’s opinion. Both Louise Charron’s and Peter Hogg’s opinions were
only conveyed orally to the government.12 The Prime Minister then took
the extraordinary step of releasing to the public Justice Binnie’s opinion,
together with approving comments by Charron and Hogg, on the same
day he announced Justice Marc Nadon’s nomination.
Clearly, the government knew that the nomination was going to be
controversial. We may assume that it is precisely because of the potential
controversy that could ensue from such an appointment that the government
took those extraordinary measures. However, they were not the right
measures. And what the government subsequently did, despite receiving
serious warnings to the contrary, only worsened the situation. If the
federal government had been diligent, it would have referred the question
to the Supreme Court first, appointed someone else in the meantime to
replace Justice Fish, and if the answer came back positive from the
Supreme Court, it could then have appointed Justice Marc Nadon to
replace Justice Louis LeBel, who is due to retire at the latest in the Fall
of 2014. Certainty would have been achieved at no cost to the credibility
of the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, this is not the path the government
chose and Quebec was deprived of one of its three constitutionally
reserved Supreme Court judges for the entire 2013-2014 term.
Indeed, Justice Nadon was sworn in, his appointment was contested
the very same day in the Federal Court and he recused himself until the
10

Id.
Prime Minister News Backgrounder: “Qualification of a member of the Federal Court
with 10 years of experience as a member of the Québec Bar to be appointed to the Supreme Court of
Canada”, September 30, 2013, online: <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/09/30/qualificationmember-federal-court-10-years-experience-member-quebec-bar-be>.
12
Order Paper, Q-437, supra, note 6, answers (ii), (jj), (kk), (mm), (nn) and (oo).
11
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issue was fully settled. Parliament rushed to amend the Supreme Court
Act by attaching the proposed changes to a budgetary Bill, and the
government referred the entire question to the Supreme Court. In an
opinion handed down March 21, 2014, a majority of the Supreme Court
(6:1) considered the appointment of Justice Nadon invalid. Quebec then
had to wait approximately three more months before Justice Clément
Gascon from the Quebec Court of Appeal was finally appointed by the
federal government to replace Justice Fish.
The story I am about to tell is thus one of constitutional imprudence
caused by political short-termism that unfortunately resulted in
predictable damage to the workings of our federation. It is the sad
chronicle of a series of decisions that do not reflect what is to be
expected from true statesmanship. I will first address the formal process
that led to the nomination of Justice Nadon (Part II). I will then turn to the
challenges to Justice Nadon’s appointment, the federal government’s
attempt at modifying the Supreme Court Act and the received warnings
that it not only chose to ignore, but that it actively derided (Part III). I will
then examine the Supreme Court’s reference (Part IV), and some of the
foreseeable constitutional consequences of the majority’s opinion (Part V).

II. THE PROCESS LEADING TO THE APPOINTMENT
OF JUSTICE NADON
First, the federal government may consult, and does consult, all sorts
of stakeholders to establish a first “long list” of potential candidates. The
Minister of Justice consulted with the Chief Justice of Canada, the Chief
Justice of Quebec, the Chief Justice of the Quebec Superior Court,
the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal, the Chief Justice of the
Federal Court, the Attorney General of Quebec, the President of the
Canadian Bar Association, the President of the Barreau du Québec, and
other prominent members of the Quebec legal community to identify
potential candidates.13 It transpired that during the consultations with the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the latter had specifically warned the
Minister of Justice of possible problems with the appointment of a
federal court judge on one of the three reserved seats for Quebec.14
13

Id., answer (a).
The fact that the Chief Justice gave this particular warning to the government led to an
ill-advised spat between the government and the Chief Justice two weeks after Justice Nadon’s
appointment had been invalidated. On May 1, 2014, senior Conservatives claimed that Chief Justice
14
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Once potential candidates agreed to submit their names for
consideration on a confidential basis, the Minister of Justice and the
Prime Minister’s Office determined who should be included in the “long
list” to be considered by the so-called “Selection Panel”. Thus, the
opinions of those who were consulted were not treated as binding —

Beverley McLachlin had lobbied against the appointment of Justice Nadon and then, when he was
nonetheless appointed, invalidated his appointment (John Ivison, “Tories incensed with Supreme Court as
some allege Chief Justice lobbied against Marc Nadon appointment” National Post (May 1, 2014), online:
<http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/05/01/tories-incensed-with-supreme-court-as-some-allege-chiefjustice-lobbied-against-marc-nadon-appointment/>). Later that day, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a
statement to reporters suggesting that Chief Justice McLachlin had inappropriately attempted to call the
Prime Minister to discuss the appointment of Justice Nadon (Tonda MacCharles, “PM refused to take
‘inadvisable, inappropriate’ call from chief justice, PMO says” The Toronto Star (May 1, 2014), online:
<http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/05/01/pm_refused_to_take_inadvisable_inappropriate_
call_from_chief_justice_pmo_says.html>). The Executive Legal Officer of the Supreme Court shot back
immediately with a rare communiqué explaining what the Chief Justice had done (and not done) when
consulted by the Minister of Justice on the appointment of a judge to replace retiring Justice Fish (Supreme
Court of Canada, News Release, May 2, 2014):
On July 31, 2013, the Chief Justice’s office called the Minister of Justice’s office and
the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, Mr. Novak, to flag a potential issue regarding the
eligibility of a judge of the federal courts to fill a Quebec seat on the Supreme Court.
Later that day, the Chief Justice spoke with the Minister of Justice, Mr. MacKay, to flag
the potential issue. The Chief Justice’s office also made preliminary inquiries to set up a
call or meeting with the Prime Minister, but ultimately the Chief Justice decided not to
pursue a call or meeting.
The Chief Justice had no other contact with the government on this issue.
The Chief Justice provided the following statement: “Given the potential impact on the
Court, I wished to ensure that the government was aware of the eligibility issue. At no
time did I express any opinion as to the merits of the eligibility issue. It is customary for
Chief Justices to be consulted during the appointment process and there is nothing
inappropriate in raising a potential issue affecting a future appointment.”
As Joan Bryden of the Canadian Press wrote, Minister of Justice Peter MacKay “escalated” the
“feud” by suggesting that the Supreme Court’s ruling on the validity of the appointment of Justice
Nadon was not based on the rules of the Supreme Court Act as they existed prior to the ruling (Joan
Bryden, “Peter MacKay escalates feud with Supreme Court’s Beverley McLachlin”, Canadian Press,
available in The Toronto Star (May 5, 2014), online: <http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/
05/05/peter_mackay_escalates_feud_with_supreme_courts_beverley_mclachlin.html>). On May 6,
2014, the Leader of the Official Opposition, Thomas Mulcair, asked the Prime Minister, in the
House of Commons, to “apologize to the chief justice and to Canadians for this unprecedented and,
indeed, inexplicable attack on one of our most respected democratic institutions, the Supreme Court
of Canada” (House of Commons Debates, 081 (May 6, 2014) (Hon. Thomas Mulcair)). The Prime
Minister, without explicitly denying that the government had attacked the Supreme Court with its
various statements, responded by saying (id.):
Mr. Speaker, I categorically reject the premise of that question.
The fact is this. In terms of the eligibility question, it was my understanding that this was
a matter that could go before the court. In fact, the government later referred the matter to
the court. For that reason, I chose not to have a discussion with the court on that question,
but instead to discuss it with independent legal experts, and we acted on their advice. (Id.
(Right Hon. Stephen Harper))
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contrary to the amendment to the Constitution proposed in the Meech
Lake Agreement15 and the Charlottetown Accord16 that would have made
the short lists provided by provinces binding. The government has
refused to indicate how many individuals appeared on the “long list”.17
On June 11, 2013, the Justice Minister announced the creation of an
ad hoc “Selection Panel” of parliamentarians composed of three
Members of Parliament (“MPs”) from the Government caucus and two
from the Opposition parties to review the “long list” established by the
Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister’s Office.18 While composed of
parliamentarians, this was not a committee of the Parliament, but a
committee meant to assist the government in its selection process. In
light of its function, it would appear more appropriate to call this panel a
“pre-selection” committee. Indeed, this committee was tasked with
reviewing and assessing the “long list” of candidates put forward by the
Minister of Justice and to provide an unranked list of three candidates to
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice for their consideration.
The Panel “was asked to consider candidates for the Supreme Court
position on the basis of merit and excellence”.19 However, it is interesting
to note that the panel was not merely composed of jurists. In fact, two out
of three MPs from the government caucus who took part in the process
leading up to Justice Nadon’s appointment had no formal legal training.20

15
Section 6 of the Meech Lake Agreement (The 1987 Constitutional Accord, Ottawa,
Ontario, June 3, 1987) would have added s. 101C to the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict,
c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
16
Section 19 of Charlottetown Accord (Consensus Report on the Constitution: Final Text,
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, August 28, 1992).
17
However, recently, The Globe and Mail has apparently been able to obtain a copy of the
“long list” in question that allegedly would have contained six names. Four of those named on the
list are federal court judges. See Sean Fine, “The secret short list that provoked the rift between
Chief Justice and PMO” The Globe and Mail (May 23, 2014), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/politics/the-secret-short-list-that-caused-a-rift-between-chief-justice-and-pmo/article18823392/?
page=all> [hereinafter “Fine, ‘The secret short list’”].
18
Canada, Minister of Justice, News Release, “Minister of Justice Announces Members of
the Supreme Court of Canada Selection Panel” (June 11, 2013), online: <http://news.gc.ca/web/
article-en.do?crtr.sj1D=&crtr.mnthndVl=12&mthd=advSrch&crtr.dpt1D=6681&nid=830869&crtr.
lc1D=&crtr.tp1D=1&crtr.yrStrtVl=2008&crtr.kw=&crtr.dyStrtVl=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl
=2&crtr.page=9&crtr.yrndVl=2015&crtr.dyndVl=31>. The Panel was composed of Mr. Jacques
Gourde (Conservative Party of Canada), Ms. Shelly Glover (Conservative Party of Canada),
Mr. Robert Goguen (Conservative Party of Canada), Ms. Françoise Boivin (New Democratic Party
of Canada), Hon. Dominic LeBlanc (Liberal Party of Canada).
19
Order Paper, Q-437, supra, note 6, answer (pp).
20
The Honourable Shelly Glover is a police officer. Her training relates to enforcement of
the law, not interpretation of the law in various domains. Jacques Gourde is a farmer.
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And of the five members on the committee, only one was a Quebec
lawyer trained in civil law.21 The Prime Minister and the Minister of
Justice were then to select a nominee from that list.
The parliamentarians who took part in the pre-selection committee were
bound by very strict confidentiality rules that prohibited them from
divulging any information pertaining to the deliberations of the ad hoc preselection committee. Initially, we knew that they consulted the same
stakeholders that the Minister of Justice had consulted when putting
together, with the Prime Minister’s Office, the “long list”.22 But since we did
not know whether there were more than three names on the so-called “long
list”, and since the pre-selection committee could not suggest additional
names, it was hard to evaluate the actual input of the committee members in
the process. According to leaks published in The Globe and Mail, it now
seems that the committee had to narrow down the pool of potential
candidates from six to three.23 Also, confidentiality rules prohibit committee
members from revealing whether or not the ultimate list of three candidates
is the product of a consensus, or merely the result of a majority decision.24 In
other words, the Minister of Justice or the Prime Minister could have given
the three government caucus members the mandate to ensure that one or
another of the candidates on the long list gets to the short list and there is
nothing that the representatives of the Opposition parties could have
done about it. This very opaque process could end up merely providing

21

Françoise Boivin (NDP).
Ad hoc Committee on the Appointment of Supreme Court of Canada Justices, Peter
MacKay (Minister of Justice), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/ja-nj/2013/doc_
32972.html> at 1310:
The panel members also consulted extensively with members of the judiciary and the
legal community, including the Chief Justice of Canada, the Chief Justice of Quebec, the
Chief Justice of the Quebec Superior Court, the chief justices of the Federal Court and the
Federal Court of Appeal, the Attorney General of Quebec, the Barreau du Québec, and
the Canadian Bar Association.
23
Fine, “The secret short list”, supra, note 17.
24
After the Supreme Court released its opinion on the validity of Justice Nadon’s
appointment, the Prime Minister, on April 1, 2014, surprisingly stated in the House of Commons that
“during … consultations, the NDP said that it did not object to appointing a Quebecker from the
Federal Court to the Supreme Court”, that “during consultations, all of the parties in the House
agreed with the idea of appointing a Quebecer from the Federal Court to the Supreme Court” and
that “the Liberal Party in fact supported the nominee for the Supreme Court” (House of Commons
Debates, 066 (April 1, 2014) (Right Hon. Stephen Harper). However, the Prime Minister did not
participate in those consultations and all of those who did were bound by a confidentiality agreement
“not to disclose any information to anyone except to members and staff of the Selection Panel, the
Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, the Judicial Affairs Advisor to
the Minister of Justice or the Minister of Justice” (Order Paper, Q-437, supra, note 6, answer (ss)).
22
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cover — offering the patina of legitimacy — to the government’s decision.
It is not the case that the rules ensure that manipulations will occur, but they
do nothing to prevent them either.
It now appears that at least one judge from a federal court had to be
on the pre-selection committee final list, as apparently four of the six
candidates on the “long list” were such judges.25 In fact, according to
Sean Fine of The Globe and Mail, the final decision of the pre-selection
committee was not unanimous and two out of three candidates who made
it to the final list were judges of the Federal Court of Appeal.26
While pre-selection committee members may have had all summer
long to process the files of each candidate on the “long list”, it would
have been better to begin the process ahead of time knowing that Justice
Fish had to retire no later than November 2013. This is particularly true
in light of the quantity of information that needs to be processed. Indeed,
each file contained the candidates’ résumés, five decisions submitted to
the pre-selection committee by the candidates themselves,27 as well as a
full list of their reported decisions since their appointment to the Bench.28
MPs on the committee, bound by the confidentiality agreement, could
not seek external assistance to analyze and review the general corpus of
precedents of each candidate. They may have received help from the
Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, but they
could not rely on their own advisors to independently review all previous
decisions by each of the candidates on the “long list”.
This system creates an unfair asymmetry of information in favour of
the government which put together the “long list”. Indeed, the government
Fine, “The secret short list”, supra, note 17.
Id.
The first question asked in the Order/Address of the House of Commons, Q-239,
questions by Irwin Cotler, (Mount Royal), January 27, 2014, answers by Tom Lukiwski, March 24,
2014 [hereinafter “Order Paper, Q-239”] is introduced by this preamble:
With regard to the appointment to the Supreme Court of Justice Marc Nadon, and the
information provided to MPs on the ad hoc·committee and available on the website of the
Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada which notes that “Each
candidate was asked to identify five decisions for particular consideration by the Panel,
preferably dealing with issues coming within the usual scope of the Supreme Court of
Canada. ... As far as possible, the choice of five decisions was to reflect at least one of
each of the following areas of law: constitutional law (Charter or federalism), criminal
law (or national security), civil law, administrative law, and the candidates’ choice”: (a)
how was this list of areas of law developed …
The answer implicitly confirms such information: “The list of areas of law was intended to reflect
issues coming within the scope of the Supreme Court of Canada — one category was left to the
candidate’s personal choice”.
28
Id., answer (h), (1) (ii), (v) and (vi).
25
26
27
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has the necessary resources to analyze all the past decisions of each
candidate it decides to put on its “long list”, while the members of the
pre-selection committee — who are not necessarily legally trained —
have access to limited resources to complete their task. This affects the
legitimacy of the process. However, Opposition parties found themselves
in a catch-22 situation: if they took part in the process, they gave
legitimacy to a skewed process; if they did not, they could later be
accused of not caring about who gets appointed to the Supreme Court.
Refusing to participate in the process — the empty-chair policy —
clearly has both pros and cons.
At any rate, following reception of the Committee’s Report, Prime
Minister Harper announced on September 30, 2013 that Justice Nadon
(who was not on the list of names proposed by the Attorney General of
Quebec29) was his nominee to fill one of the three seats reserved for
Quebec judges by section 6 of the Supreme Court Act.
Two days later, Justice Nadon appeared before another ad hoc
committee made of parliamentarians — again, not an official House
committee — to answer general questions about himself and his career.
This meeting was public and questions dealing with substantive legal
issues that may arise in the course of a case were deemed out-of-bounds.
This was not a “confirmation” hearing in the American sense; the ad hoc
committee had no decision power, nor the power to make any
recommendation to the government regarding the appointment.
On October 3, 2013, by Order in Council P.C. 2013-1050, Justice
Nadon was officially named Supreme Court judge and was sworn in on
October 7, 2013.

III. THE CHALLENGES TO THE APPOINTMENT OF
JUSTICE NADON AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT’S REACTIONS
A few hours after Justice Nadon had been sworn in, the appointment
was being challenged in the Federal Court by Toronto lawyer Rocco

29
Bertrand St-Arnaud, then Quebec’s Minister of Justice, had presented a list of four names
to his federal counterpart, none of which was a judge appointed to a federal court (Paul Journet, “Le
Québec lésé par le retrait du juge Nadon, dénonce Cloutier” La Presse (October 9, 2013), online:
<http://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/national/201310/09/01-4698047-le-quebec-lese-par-le-retrait-dujuge-nadon-denonce-cloutier.php>).
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Galati.30 Within less than 24 hours, the Supreme Court issued a statement
declaring that Justice Nadon had decided “not to participate for the time
being in matters before the Supreme Court of Canada”.31
Scholars quickly got busy examining the federal government’s
interpretation of sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act and came out
with serious doubts about the government’s claims. Paul Daly’s blog32 on
October 9 was probably the first to take a substantive look at the issues.
It was quickly followed by Michael Plaxton and Carissima Mathen’s
paper that initially came out on the Social Science Research Network on
October 23, and was later published in Constitutional Forum.33 Daly,
Plaxton and Mathen concluded that while section 5 allowed for the
appointment of Federal Court judges to the Supreme Court, section 6 is
worded differently and was meant to set additional criteria for the
appointment of the three judges representing Quebec on the Bench.
The basic argument against the validity of Justice Nadon’s
appointment to the Supreme Court boiled down to this: section 5 sets the
basic requirements that the appointees may be persons who are or have
been judges of a superior court of a province, or they may also be current
or former lawyers who have been standing at the bar of a province for at
least 10 years. For section 6 appointments, only candidates who are
currently judges of the Court of Appeal or of the Superior Court of the
Province of Quebec, or current members of the Quebec bar would be
eligible. The textual arguments in favour of such a reading are supported
by the framers’ intent to ensure that the section 6 appointees have
contemporary connection to the civil law tradition of Quebec in order to
adequately represent its legal traditions and social values.
The Quebec government, on October 17, declared that it was
examining different scenarios to challenge the appointment: a reference

30
Galati et al. v. The Right Honourable Stephen Harper et al., Federal Court of Canada,
File No. T-1657-13. See Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014
SCC 21, at para. 10 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Supreme Court Reference (2014)”].
31
Supreme Court of Canada, News Release, October 8, 2013, online: <http://scc-csc.
lexum.com/scc- csc/news/en/item/4401/index.do>.
32
Paul Daly, “Eligibility to sit on the Supreme Court of Canada” Administrative Law
Matters (October 9, 2013), online: <http://administrativelawmatters.blogspot.ca/2013/10/eligibilityto-sit-on-supreme-court-of.html>; Paul Daly, “More on section 6 of the Supreme Court Act:
Legislative History and Purpose” Administrative Law Matters (October 16, 2013), online:
<http://administrativelawmatters.blogspot.ca/2013/10/more-on-section-6-of-supreme-court-act.html>.
33
Michael Plaxton & Carissima Mathen, “Purposive Interpretation, Quebec, and the
Supreme Court Act” (2013) 22:3 Constitutional Forum 15, initially made public online:
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344452>.
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to the Quebec Court of Appeal, joining Galati’s court challenge, adoption
of a motion by the National Assembly, etc.34 The main focus of Quebec’s
opposition was that Justice Nadon did not seem to qualify under section 6
of the Supreme Court Act to be one of the three judges representing
Quebec at the Court, as he was not a judge of the Court of Appeal or
Superior Court of Quebec, nor a current member of the Quebec Bar.
The federal government was, at precisely that time, under significant
pressure due to having appointing senators who appeared to have acted
wrongfully. It did not want to deal with another appointment misfire. To
try to quickly shut down challenges to Justice Nadon’s appointment, on
October 22, the government introduced two sections in its omnibus
budgetary implementation Bill designed to “declare” that anyone who
had been a member for at least 10 years of a provincial bar — and for
section 6, the Bar of Quebec — qualified to become a Supreme Court
judge.35 Simultaneously, the government launched a reference to the
Supreme Court to determine the meaning of sections 5 and 6 of the
Supreme Court Act and to confirm the validity of the so-called
“declaratory” provisions that it was about to adopt in its budget bill.36

34
Patrick Bergeron, “Cour suprême: Québec va contester la nomination de Marc Nadon”
La Presse, October 17, 2013, online: <http://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/justice-et-affaires-criminelles/
201310/17/01-4700699-cour-supreme-quebec-va-contester-la-nomination-de-marc-nadon.php>.
35
Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2, S.C. 2013, c. 40, ss. 471, 472 (Bill C-4). The
clauses read:
471. The Supreme Court Act is
471. La Loi sur la Cour suprême
amended by adding the following
est modifiée par adjonction, après
after section 5:
l’article 5, de ce qui suit:
5.1 For greater certainty, for
5.1 Pour l’application de l’article
the purpose of section 5, a person
5, il demeure entendu que les juges
may be appointed a judge if, at any
peuvent être choisis parmi les
time, they were a barrister or
personnes qui ont autrefois été
advocate of at least 10 years
inscrites comme avocat pendant au
standing at the bar of a province.
moins dix ans au barreau d’une
province.
472. The Act is amended by adding
472. La même loi est modifiée par
the following after section 6:
adjonction, après l’article 6, de ce
6.1 For greater certainty, for
qui suit:
the purpose of section 6, a judge is
6.1 Pour l’application de l’article
from among the advocates of the
6, il demeure entendu que les juges
Province of Quebec if, at any time,
peuvent être choisis parmi les
they were an advocate of at least 10
personnes qui ont autrefois été
years standing at the bar of that
inscrites comme avocat pendant au
Province.
moins dix ans au barreau de la
province de Québec.
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Order in Council, P.C. 2013-1105.
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The Quebec government intervened in the reference three days later,
on October 25. This intervention might have been perceived as being
purely motivated by the sovereigntist ideology and political calculations
of the Parti Québécois, which was then forming a minority government.
However, on October 29, the National Assembly adopted a unanimous
motion to the effect that it (1) recalls that at least three judges of the
Supreme Court must be taken from judges sitting at the Court of Appeal
or Superior Court of Quebec, or from among current members of the
Quebec Bar; (2) recalls that this constitutional guarantee is meant to
safeguard Quebec’s specificity and its civil law, and that it cannot be
modified without the National Assembly’s consent; (3) recalls that
Quebec’s historical position has been that those three judges ought to be
selected from among the candidates suggested by the Attorney General
of Quebec; (4) recalls that it is important that the three judges from
Quebec be present when the Supreme Court hears major cases involving
Quebec; (5) deplores the federal government’s unilateralism in
appointing the last judge from Quebec; (6) deplores that the Prime
Minister’s decision has led to the challenging of the said judge, forcing
him to temporarily withdraw, thus depriving Quebec of one-third of its
representation on the Supreme Court.37 In other words, a unanimous
National Assembly rejected Justice Nadon’s appointment to one of the
three seats reserved to ensure the “représentation du Québec” — these
are the very words of the French version of the Supreme Court Act.

37
Journal des débats de l’Assemblée nationale, 40th Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 43, No. 84
(October 29, 2013):
Que l’Assemblée nationale rappelle que la Loi sur la Cour suprême confère
au Québec trois juges à la Cour suprême et que ceux-ci doivent être choisis
parmi les juges de la Cour d’appel ou de la Cour supérieure du Québec ou
parmi les avocats en exercice, membres du Barreau du Québec;
Qu’elle rappelle que cette garantie constitutionnelle préserve la spécificité
québécoise et civiliste et ne peut être altérée ou autrement modifiée sans le
consentement de l’Assemblée nationale du Québec;
Qu’elle rappelle la position historique du Québec selon laquelle [...] trois juges du
Québec à la Cour suprême devraient être sélectionnés parmi les candidats
recommandés par le Procureur général du Québec au gouvernement fédéral;
Qu’elle rappelle l’importance que la Cour suprême puisse compter trois juges
du Québec lors de l’audition de causes majeures pour le Québec;
Qu’elle déplore l’unilatéralisme dont a fait preuve le gouvernement fédéral
lors de la nomination du dernier juge du Québec à la Cour suprême;
Qu’elle déplore que la décision du premier ministre du Canada ait mené à la
contestation de la nomination de ce juge, ainsi qu’au retrait temporaire de ce
dernier, ce qui prive actuellement le Québec du tiers de sa représentation à la
Cour suprême.
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Rocco Galati’s court challenge had already been a major blow to the
process, but the intervention of the Québec government was probably a
fatal one. While Galati’s challenge showed that the legal case for Justice
Nadon’s appointment was not watertight, thus raising questions about the
legal legitimacy of a judge appointed at the apex of the justice system,
the unanimous rejection by the elected representatives of Quebec of the
judge who was meant to ensure the representation of the Province at the
Supreme Court cast a long shadow over his political legitimacy. Judges
not wielding the power of the sword, or the power of the purse, depend
on tacit acceptance of their legitimacy to ensure that their decision will
be enforced. The unanimous motion of the National Assembly may well
have proved to be the kiss of death to this appointment. Indeed, it may
have been hard for Justice Nadon to recover from it. From then on, how
could he ever benefit from the unquestioned legitimacy required to hear
cases opposing the Quebec government to its federal counterpart? By
saying this, I certainly do not mean to question Justice Nadon’s personal
integrity and sincere impartiality, but rather to suggest this raised a major
problem of political perceptions. If Justice Nadon’s appointment had
been confirmed, he would have been labelled in Quebec “the SupremeCourt-judge-representing-Quebec-against-its-will”. This would have
played straight in the hands of the nationalists who are pleased to repeat
since Duplessis that the Supreme Court is like the Pisa Tower; always
leaning towards Ottawa.38
Of course, by then, it was too late for the federal government to
cancel Justice Nadon’s appointment. He had already been sworn in and
he certainly could not have been impeached. Justice Nadon alone could
have decided to resign. However, at that point, the federal government
could have tried to mitigate its potential losses by simply letting the
Supreme Court decide on whether or not the appointment was consistent
with sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act and by dropping its
attempt to modify the Supreme Court Act. That way, if Justice Nadon’s
appointment had been confirmed, he would have been able to sit without
having to support the extra burden on his perceived legitimacy that his
appointment was retroactively made valid by changing the rules of the
game. And if his appointment were to be declared invalid by the
Supreme Court, the latter would not have to expound on the controversial

38
Florian Sauvageau, et al., La Cour suprême du Canada et les médias: à qui le dernier mot?
(Québec: Presses Université Laval, 2006), at 133-34.
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meaning of the amending formulas dealing with the Supreme Court and
its composition.
Indeed, up until the decision came down in the Supreme Court
Reference (2014), it was unclear whether or not the existence of the
Supreme Court and its composition were already entrenched. This left
open a significant amount of space for negotiations and cooperation at a
sub-constitutional level between governments on such issues. However,
by adopting the amendments to the Supreme Court Act39 declaring that a
judge having been a member of the Quebec Bar for at least 10 years at
any point in his or her life was sufficient to qualify for appointment, the
government took a huge gamble. The amendment meant that if the Court
were to disagree with the federal government’s reading of sections 5 and
6 as they initially stood, the Court would then be forced to examine the
constitutionality of the amendment before determining if it validated
retroactively the appointment. And, while examining the constitutionality
of the amendment, the Court might very well determine that certain parts
of the Supreme Court are now entrenched and can no longer be modified
legislatively — thus closing down the opportunity for sub-constitutional
arrangements, and opening up the problem of distinguishing between the
parts of the Supreme Court that are entrenched from those that are not.
The government had been publicly warned of such risks — and of
additional ones! During the hearings of the Standing Committee on
Justice and Human Rights that was tasked with examining the sections of
the omnibus Bill that were meant to modify the Supreme Court Act,
many witnesses told the MPs that this course of action was a risky one
for several reasons. For example, Carissima Mathen testified to the effect
that section 6, according to its purpose and legislative intent, did not allow
for the appointment of a Federal Court judge to one of Quebec’s three
reserved seats. She also warned that if the Supreme Court were to consider
it entrenched, this would “constrain the potential scope of any declaratory
legislation”.40 The government caucus MPs reacted with scoffs.
Paul Daly nonetheless testified in Standing Senate Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs to the same effect: “Although the
Supreme Court Act does not form part of the Constitution of Canada, the
Supreme Court of Canada may well conclude, in the face of unilateral
Parliamentary action, that certain core provisions of the Supreme Court
39

Royal Assent was given on December 12, 2013. See S.C. 2013, c. 40.
Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 41st
Parl., 2nd Sess., No. 5, November 19, 2013 (Carissima Mathen, witness).
40
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Act, or certain essential and fundamental characteristics of the Supreme
Court of Canada, are constitutionally entrenched and beyond the powers
of Parliament.”41 Daly also testified that he did not believe that section 6
allowed for the appointment of a Federal Court judge as one of the three
representatives of Quebec. He astutely remarked that Justice Gerald Le
Dain, a civil law lawyer, had been appointed to the Supreme Court from
the Federal Court of Appeal, but not as a section 6 judge. Indeed, when
he was appointed to the Bench, he took over the position of Justice
Dickson, who had been appointed to replace Chief Justice Laskin, who
had died. Justices Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer were already there as
section 6 judges. In fact, all former Federal Court judges who have ever
been appointed to the Supreme Court had only been section 5 judges —
and nothing barred a jurist from Quebec from being appointed to one of
those positions. Justice Arbour was born in Montreal and she studied law
at the Université de Montréal. Justice Bastarache was in the same class
as Justice Arbour at the Faculty of Law of the Université de Montréal.
Neither of them was considered to be a section 6 judge.
Adam Dodek testified in the Standing Committee on Justice and
Human Rights that in his opinion, “clauses 471 and 472 [of Bill C-a] are
not a proper subject of a budget bill; second, by bringing a reference to
the Supreme Court about these very provisions, the government is
interfering with the proper work of [the] House [of Commons]”.42 The
first point that Professor Dodek made was a very important one. He was
referring to what I have taken to calling “Christmas-tree Bills”; Bills that
are not mere omnibus Bills, but rather budgetary bills to which the
government hangs unrelated matters. Such Bills have been prohibited
since at least the 18th century in the Parliament of Westminster. Dodek
believed that what was “at stake here is no less than the democratic
features of the House of Commons. Bills such as this one are a threat to
democracy in Canada.” It is true that he did not say that such bundling of
unrelated non-financial issues into a budget Bill was, strictly speaking,
unconstitutional. However, I personally did go as far as that when
I testified before the Standing Committee.43

41
Canada, Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional
Affairs, 41st Parl., 2nd Sess., Issue 1, Evidence, November 21, 2013 (Paul Daly, witness).
42
Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 41st
Parl., 2nd Sess., No. 5, November 19, 2013 (Adam Dodek, witness).
43
Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 41st
Parl., 2nd sess., No. 5, November 21, 2013 (Hugo Cyr, witness).
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Indeed, in my own testimony, I told the Standing Committee that I
did not believe that section 6 allowed for the appointment of a Federal
Court judge, that I did not believe that sections 471 and 472 were merely
declaratory, that the proposed modifications ran the risk of being in
violation of section 41(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982,44 and finally, that
the Supreme Court may find that “Christmas-tree Bills” violate the
entrenched constitutional principles of “parliamentary democracy”45 and
“responsible government”.46 I thus advised the Standing Committee that,
if Parliament truly wanted to adopt its intended changes to the Supreme
Court Act, the federal government should (1) negotiate the amendment it
sought with the provinces; and (2) put it in a separate bill. Knowing that
the chances of coming up with an agreement with the provinces on the
intended changes in the very short term were close to nil, the more
prudent course of action for the federal government would have been to
drop the intended amendment, and simply hope that the Supreme Court
would validate the appointment on the basis of what the Minister of
Justice thought was the right interpretation of the Supreme Court Act. But
sadly, that is not what the government did.
44

Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT REFERENCE (2014)
The reference questions that were asked by the Government to the
Supreme Court were:
1. Can a person who was, at any time, an advocate of at least 10 years
standing at the Barreau du Québec be appointed to the Supreme Court
of Canada as a member of the Supreme Court from Quebec pursuant to
sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act?
2. Can Parliament enact legislation that requires that a person be or
has previously been a barrister or advocate of at least 10 years standing
at the bar of a province as a condition of appointment as a judge of the
Supreme Court of Canada or enact the annexed declaratory provisions
as set out in clauses 471 and 472 of the Bill entitled Economic Action
Plan 2013 Act, No. 2?47

1. The Majority Opinion on the Interpretation of Sections 5 and 6
of the Supreme Court Act
Six of the seven judges who heard the case48 concluded that a judge
of the Federal Court or Federal Court of Appeal is ineligible for
appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada under section 6 of the
Supreme Court Act. While section 5 sets out the general conditions of
eligibility for appointment — one has either to be (1) a current judge of a
superior court, or court of appeal, of a province; (2) a former judge of
such courts; (3) a current lawyer of at least 10 years’ standing at the Bar
of a province; or (4) a former lawyer of at least 10 years’ standing —
section 6 narrows the pool for judges appointed to represent Quebec by
adding requirements. Only (1) current judges of the Superior Court or
Court of Appeal of Quebec; and (2) current members of the Barreau du
Québec are eligible under section 6 of the Supreme Court Act. In other
words, section 6 adds two specifications: (1) that the status as a judge or
as a member of the Bar must be current; and (2) the courts and Bar in
question have to be Quebec’s. The majority summarized their reasons for
their interpretation of the requirements of section 6 as follows:
We come to this conclusion for four main reasons. First, the plain
meaning of s. 6 has remained consistent since the original version of

47

Supra, note 36.
Justice Rothstein, having himself been elevated from the Federal Court of Appeal to the
Supreme Court, did not take part in the proceedings. He is not a s. 6 judge.
48
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that provision was enacted in 1875, and it has always excluded former
advocates. Second, this interpretation gives effect to important
differences in the wording of ss. 5 and 6. Third, this interpretation of s. 6
advances its dual purpose of ensuring that the Court has civil law
expertise and that Quebec’s legal traditions and social values are
represented on the Court and that Quebec’s confidence in the Court be
maintained. Finally, this interpretation is consistent with the broader
scheme of the Supreme Court Act for the appointment of ad hoc judges.49

The majority proves extremely sensitive to the dual functions of
many constitutional rules; constitutional rules are not only meant to set
up institutions and provide for their workings, they also are meant to
contribute to the legitimacy of such institutions by sending the adequate
signals to stakeholders. The Court thus wrote:
The purpose of s. 6 is to ensure not only civil law training and
experience on the Court, but also to ensure that Quebec’s distinct legal
traditions and social values are represented on the Court, thereby
enhancing the confidence of the people of Quebec in the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter of their rights. Put differently, s. 6 protects
both the functioning and the legitimacy of the Supreme Court as a
general court of appeal for Canada.50

A little later, the Court goes on: “… Requiring the appointment of
current members of civil law institutions was intended to ensure not only
that those judges were qualified to represent Quebec on the Court, but
that they were perceived by Quebecers as being so qualified.”51 This
clearly echoes the concerns mentioned earlier about the consequences of
having a unanimous motion adopted by the National Assembly rejecting
the appointment of Justice Nadon.
2. The Dissenting Opinion on the Interpretation of Sections 5 and 6
of the Supreme Court Act
Justice Moldaver rejected the majority’s interpretation of sections 5
and 6. He was of the view that section 6 did not add further requirements
to section 5 apart from specifying that the three seats that were reserved
for Quebec judges had to be filled by appointees who fulfilled section 5
requirements in Quebec institutions (i.e., the Superior Court and the
49
50
51

Supreme Court Reference (2014), supra, note 30, at para. 18.
Id., at para. 49 (underline added; emphasis in the original).
Id., at para. 56 (emphasis added).
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Court of Appeal of Quebec, and the Barreau du Québec, respectively, for
judges and lawyers). He read no currency requirement in section 6.
He has rather harsh words for the majority’s textual interpretation of
sections 5 and 6:
... Hence, for the purposes of s. 6, if it is not read in conjunction with s. 5,
any member of the Quebec bar, including a newly minted member of
one day’s standing, would be eligible for a Quebec seat on this Court.
Faced with this manifest absurdity, the majority acknowledges that
the phrase “advocates of that Province” in s. 6 must be linked to the
10-year eligibility requirement for members of the bar specified in s. 5.
But that, they say, is where the link ends. It does not extend to the fact
that under s. 5, both current and past members of the bar of at least 10 years
standing are eligible. With respect, this amounts to cherry-picking.
Choosing from s. 5 only those aspects of it that are convenient — and
jettisoning those that are not — is a principle of statutory interpretation
heretofore unknown.52

I am far from convinced that the majority actually went cherrypicking here. There is no arbitrariness in the majority’s view that section 5
sets general requirements for appointment, and that section 6 says that
among the pool of available candidates fitting section 5, three will also
have to meet additional requirements. Sections 5 and 6 are linked, but
nonetheless it makes sense that they are not identical. Would it be cherrypicking to highlight the fact that section 6 requires membership in the
Barreau du Québec but section 5 does not? In fact, I venture that it may
be Moldaver J. who used a heretofore unknown principle of statutory
interpretation: interpreting two linked provisions as if they were
identical, even if they are clearly phrased differently.
In any event, Moldaver J. agreed with the majority that “[t]he
objective of s. 6 is, and always has been, to ensure that a specified
number of this Court’s judges are trained in civil law and represent
Quebec.”53 While he also agreed with the majority that the civil law
training and affiliation with the institutions mentioned in section 6 serve
to protect Quebec’s civil law tradition and “inspire Quebec’s confidence
in [the] Court”, he did “not agree that s. 6 was intended to ensure that
‘Quebec’s ... social values are represented on the Court’ …”.54 He argues

52
53
54

Id., at paras. 123-124.
Id., at para. 145.
Id.
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that to pretend that Quebec wanted to render ineligible former lawyers of
at least 10 years standing is a baseless historical fabrication.55
At bottom, Moldaver J. took issue with the line-drawing exercise
involved in reading section 6 the way the majority did. He could not see
any reason why Quebec would oppose the appointment to the Supreme
Court of a provincial court judge who had previously been a standing
member of the Barreau du Québec for at least 10 years prior to being
appointed to the Court of Quebec. After all, the “... Court of Québec
judges apply the civil law on a daily basis”.56 Justice Moldaver agreed
with the majority that it is Parliament’s choice to use objective criteria to
draw lines that may be under-inclusive, and thus fail to achieve
perfection, but he contends that when the Court determines what those
are, “absurd results are to be avoided”.57
However, concluding that Parliament excluded all jurists but for
those currently affiliated with the institutions mentioned in section 6 does
not lead to absurd results. It leads to imperfect results, but not necessarily
absurd results. Indeed, if we go down the path suggested by Moldaver J.,
we may also wonder what reason Quebec could have to oppose the
appointment of an eminent Quebec civil law professor who had never
joined the Bar. Such a highly qualified individual would nonetheless be
ineligible for appointment according to both the majority’s reading of
section 6 and Moldaver J.’s. That does not make section 6 absurd, it
simply makes it under-inclusive because it excludes individuals who may
very well otherwise possess the necessary qualities to carry out the
function properly.
Finally, Moldaver J. was convinced that the currency requirement
does nothing to further the objective of section 6 of promoting the
confidence of Quebec in the Supreme Court.58 He wrote, for example:
“... In Quebec, there are approximately 16,000 current members of the
Quebec bar with at least 10 years standing. Surely it cannot be suggested
that the appointment of any one of these 16,000 advocates would
promote the confidence of Quebec in this Court.”59 Justice Moldaver
may be confusing “necessary conditions” with “sufficient conditions”.
He appears to be making the same mistake when he writes that “[i]n sum,

55
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a person could have only the most tenuous link to the practice of civil law
in Quebec, and yet be a current member of that bar of 10 years standing.”60
We do not read the majority opinion as suggesting that the currency
requirement was sufficient to promote the confidence of Quebec in the
Supreme Court, nor that it ensured current knowledge of civil law.
However, it was the minimal requirement that was statutorily set to frame
the executive discretion in appointing judges for Quebec. Nowhere does
the statute contemplate that appointment to the Supreme Court ought to be
made by lottery where everyone who formally qualifies should get a
ticket! That is also why Moldaver J.’s hypothetical argument about the
former lawyer of 10 years’ standing who would join the Barreau du
Québec for a single day to be appointed must also fall flat. Let us assume,
for the sake of argument, that such a lawyer may fit the formal criteria for
appointment. It is far from certain that such a candidate would possess the
other characteristics that would in fact convince “the people of Québec”61
that she or he is adequate to be its representative on the Bench.
3. The Majority Opinion on the Constitutionality of Sections 471
and 472 of the Bill Entitled Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2
Since the majority came to the conclusion that section 6 did not
allow for the appointment of Justice Nadon, it also had to examine the
validity of the amendment to section 6 included in Bill C-4. Indeed, the
modification to section 6 of the Supreme Court Act could no longer be
presented as merely “declaratory” since it aimed at excluding the
requirement of contemporaneous membership to the Quebec Bar from
the eligibility conditions. Were the legislative changes made validly
pursuant to Parliament’s legislative powers, or were they unconstitutional
as an invalid attempt to modify the “Constitution of Canada in relation
to” “the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada” without having
obtained the consent of all 10 legislative assemblies as provided by
section 41(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982?
The majority of the Court concluded that the current composition of
the Supreme Court was entrenched and that
[b]oth the general eligibility requirements for appointment and the
specific eligibility requirements for appointment from Quebec are

60
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aspects of the composition of the Court. It follows that any substantive
change in relation to those eligibility requirements is an amendment to
the Constitution in relation to the composition of the Supreme Court of
Canada and triggers the application of Part V of the Constitution Act,
1982. Any change to the eligibility requirements for appointment to the
three Quebec positions on the Court codified in s. 6 therefore requires
the unanimous consent of Parliament and the 10 provinces. 62

Section 6.1 of the Supreme Court Act (section 472 of Economic
Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2) was therefore declared to be ultra vires
because it had been adopted unilaterally, without the consent of the 10
provincial legislatures.63
Justice Moldaver, while he did not need to express his views on this
in light of his interpretations of sections 5 and 6 and, therefore, of the
merely declaratory nature of sections 471 and 472 of the Economic
Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2, nonetheless expressly chose to state that he
agreed with the majority’s view that the three seats reserved on the
Supreme Court is part of the “composition of the Supreme Court of
Canada” and, thus, could only be modified through the unanimous
consent formula of section 41(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982. However,
he added that he was “not convinced that any and all changes to the
eligibility requirements will necessarily come within ‘the composition of
the Supreme Court of Canada’ in s. 41(d).”64
The conclusion that certain elements of the Supreme Court are
constitutionally protected was far from self-evident since the latter was
created by a mere federal statute in 1875 in accordance with Parliament’s
legislative power to “provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and
Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada” granted by section
101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.65 No explicit entrenchment of the
existence of the Supreme Court in formal constitutional instruments was
made before the adoption of sections 41(d) and 42(1)(d), which provide:
41. An amendment to the
Constitution of Canada in
relation to the following
matters may be made by
proclamation issued by the
62
63
64
65

41. Toute modification de la
Constitution du Canada portant
sur les questions suivantes se fait
par proclamation du gouverneur
général sous le grand sceau du

Supreme Court Reference (2014), supra, note 30, at para. 105.
Id., at para. 106.
Id., at para. 115.
(U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5).
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Governor General under the
Great Seal of Canada only
where authorized by resolutions
of the Senate and House of
Commons and of the legislative
assembly of each province:

Canada, autorisée par des
résolutions du Sénat, de la
Chambre des communes et de
l’assemblée législative de chaque
province :

…

[…]

(d) the composition of the
Supreme Court of Canada; …

d) la composition de la Cour
suprême du Canada …;

42(1) An amendment to
the Constitution of Canada in
relation to the following
matters may be made only in
accordance with subsection
38(1):

42(1) Toute modification de
la Constitution du Canada portant
sur les questions suivantes se fait
conformément au paragraphe
38(1) :

…

[…]

(d) subject to paragraph 41(d),
the Supreme Court of Canada ...

d) sous réserve de l’alinéa 41(d),
la Cour suprême du Canada ...
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To come to its conclusions, the Court therefore had to determine that
the “Constitution of Canada” contains entrenched rules about the
“Supreme Court of Canada” and its “composition” — rules that could
not be amended without following the proper amending formula. It could
have been the case that no such rules had yet been entrenched and,
therefore, that no such constitutional rules already existed (i.e., current
rules regarding the Supreme Court would only have been of a statutory
nature). The latter option was dubbed by the Supreme Court the “empty
vessels” theory. In short, the “empty vessels” theory held that since the
Supreme Court had not been constitutionalized prior to the adoption of
the Constitution Act, 1982, the amendment rules were to be applicable
only to entrench rules about the Court in the future, and once entrenched,
the modification procedures would become applicable to such newly
constitutionalized rules.
The Court disagreed with the “empty vessels” theory and declared
that both the composition of the Supreme Court and the Court’s
“essential features” are entrenched; both require formal constitutional
amendments to be modified. The majority specified the meaning of
“composition” thus: “The notion of ‘composition’ refers to ss. 4(1), 5 and
6 of the Supreme Court Act, which codify the composition of and
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eligibility requirements for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada
as they existed in 1982.”66 The majority also declared that the “essential
features” of the Supreme Court that would require formal amendment
according to section 42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982, “include, at
the very least, the Court’s jurisdiction as the final general court of appeal
for Canada, including in matters of constitutional interpretation, and its
independence”.67
I must confess that I did not think that the so-called “empty vessels”
theory was implausible. After all, if sections 41(d) and 42(1)(d) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 provide for an “amendment to the Constitution of
Canada” regarding the composition of the Supreme Court or regarding
the Supreme Court itself, it makes sense to ask what, if any, rules dealing
with such issues are part of the “Constitution of Canada”, and to wonder
how any such rules regarding the Supreme Court had found their way
into the entrenched Constitution.
The majority’s argument on the entrenchment of the Supreme
Court is anything but formalistic. For the Court, the Statute of
Westminster, combined with the end of appeals to the Privy Council in
London, had the effect of putting the Supreme Court of Canada at the
apex of the judicial system charged with protecting the Constitution.
The Court claims that by the end of the 1970s, “the Supreme Court
emerged as a constitutionally essential institution engaging both
federal and provincial interests. Increasingly, those concerned with
constitutional reform accepted that future reforms would have to
recognize the Supreme Court’s position within the architecture of the
Constitution.”68 The adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982 is said to
have “enhanced the Court’s role under the Constitution and confirmed its
status as a constitutionally protected institution”.69 Note here that by
using the terms “enhanced” and “confirmed” instead of “established” and
“entrenched”, the Court suggests that constitutionalization had already
happened before 1982. The Court goes on to say that section 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 declares that the Constitution of Canada is the
supreme law of the land, and “[t]he existence of an impartial and
authoritative judicial arbiter is a necessary corollary of the enactment

66
67
68
69

Id., at para. 91.
Id., at para. 94.
Id., at para. 87.
Id., at para. 88 (emphasis added).
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of the supremacy clause”. 70 Citing Reference re Secession of
Quebec,71 the majority repeats that “the Canadian system of
government was transformed to a significant extent from a system of
Parliamentary supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy”. 72 And
therefore, the Supreme Court must assume its status as “guardian of
the Constitution”. 73 The Court summarizes its position on its own
constitutionalization by declaring that it had “gained [its]
constitutional status as a result of its evolution into the final general
court of appeal for Canada, with jurisdiction to hear appeals
concerning all the laws of Canada and the provinces, including the
Constitution” and that “[t]his status was confirmed in the Constitution
Act, 1982, which made modifications of the Court’s composition and
other essential features subject to stringent amending procedures”. 74
Again, note that entrenchment is supposed to have happened as a
result of “evolution” and that the Constitution Act, 1982 merely
“confirmed” the Court’s constitutional status.
The majority also countered the “empty vessels” theory with
pragmatic arguments related to putative intentions of the framers. While
the Court did not contemplate the possibility that sections 41(d) and
42(1)(d) might have resulted from a drafting mistake, it could not fathom
why the provinces would have agreed to entrench the Supreme Court’s
“exclusion from constitutional protection” and to “insulate this unilateral
federal power [to modify the Supreme Court and its composition] from
amendment except through the exacting procedures in Part V”.75
This reflects two elements at the heart of the Court’s pragmatic
arguments. A first policy argument related to federalism leads to the
conclusion that provinces could not have agreed to let Parliament
“unilaterally and fundamentally change the Court, including Quebec’s
historically guaranteed representation, through ordinary legislation”.76
Allowing Parliament to unilaterally change the institution that is
ultimately in charge of arbitrating its disputes with the provinces would

70

Id., at para. 89.
[1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 72 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Secession
Reference”].
72
Supreme Court Reference (2014), supra, note 30, at para. 89.
73
Id., citing Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155
(S.C.C.), per Dickson J.
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Id., at para. 95 (emphasis added).
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Id., at para. 98 (emphasis in original).
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Id., at para. 99.
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change the balance of powers within the federation. It is with that danger
in mind that the majority concluded that
[o]ur constitutional history shows that ss. 41(d) and 42(1)(d) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 were enacted in the context of ongoing
constitutional negotiations that anticipated future amendments relating
to the Supreme Court. The amending procedures in Part V were meant
to guide that process. By setting out in Part V how changes were to be
made to the Supreme Court and its composition, the clear intention was
to freeze the status quo in relation to the Court’s constitutional role,
pending future changes. … This reflects the political and social
consensus at the time that the Supreme Court was an essential part of
Canada’s constitutional architecture.77

Once this putative federal bargain was established, an implicit
federal-related policy kicked in to justify the use of the static metaphor
of “frozen” constitutional rules — as opposed to the dynamic metaphor
of constitutional “evolution” that had led to the constitutionalization of
the Supreme Court’s existence. It appears that when constitutional
provisions are the result of an agreement between federal partners as to
how to reconcile their conflicting interests, courts should not tamper with
such compromises as long as partners hold on to the importance of such
a bargain. The Court recognized that “purposive interpretation … must
be informed by and not undermine that compromise”.78 The reason is that
courts should not create disincentives for federal partners to negotiate
solutions to their conflicting interests by modifying such solutions in
unpredictable ways. For example, such a policy concern appears to be at
the foundation of a series of decisions about the composition and
function of the Senate79 or certain religion and education rights.80
In those cases, the Court tends to avoid the “evolving” constitutional
trope to refrain from upsetting the initial bargain between federal
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Id., at para. 100.
Id., at para. 48.
Reference re Legislative Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House, [1979]
S.C.J. No. 94, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 (S.C.C.) and Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32,
2014 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Senate Reform”].
80
Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.); Reference re
Education Act (Que.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 68, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.); Greater Montreal
Protestant School Board v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 19, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 377
(S.C.C.); Reference Re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 44,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (S.C.C.); Reference re Adoption Act, [1938] S.C.J. No. 21, [1938] S.C.R. 398,
at 402 (S.C.C.), Duff J.
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partners.81 The Court may turn again to a dynamic metaphor to interpret
such constitutional provisions when it senses that those provisions have
taken on a life of their own — for example, when a political compromise
is imagined as a fundamental civic right.82
A second policy argument related to constitutionalism led the Court
to the conclusion that “[t]he framers cannot have intended to diminish
the constitutional protection accorded to the Court, while at the same
time enhancing its constitutional role under the Constitution Act, 1982”.83
The claim the Court made that accepting the “empty vessels” theory
“would mean that the Court would have less protection than at any other
point in its history since the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council”84
is patently false, unless the Supreme Court is arguing that it was the
abolition of the appeals to the Privy Council by Parliament’s An Act to
amend the Supreme Court Act85 that entrenched the Supreme Court. The
Court’s new composition (nine judges instead of its previous six
members) would also have to have been entrenched by the statute.86 Be
that as it may, there is nonetheless a strong policy argument in favour of
ensuring the independence of the Supreme Court and protecting its
powers when the constitutional constraints imposed on both the
legislative and the executive branches are increased. Otherwise, such
constitutional constraints may not be effective.
However, if the policy reasons given by the Court appear convincing,
the how of the entrenchment of certain sections of a mere statute remains
a total mystery. Through what precise constitutional mechanism were
sections 4(1), 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act entrenched? What does
the Court precisely mean by “evolution” in this context? It cannot refer
to the incremental “organic growth” of the Constitution resulting from
successive judicial decisions as this is not a case of extension of a series

81
See also, for example, British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney
General); Re An Act respecting the Vancouver Island Railway, [1994] S.C.J. No. 35, [1994] 2 S.C.R.
41, at 88 (S.C.C.).
82
Language rights used to be read mostly with some original political compromise in mind
(see, for example: Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Assn. of Parents for Fairness
in Education, [1986] S.C.J. No. 26, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, at 578 (S.C.C.)), but recent case law has
recast such rights as a form of human right, and thus amenable to a more generous and purposive
approach (R. v. Beaulac, [1999] S.C.J. No. 25, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, at paras. 24-25 (S.C.C.)).
83
Supreme Court Reference (2014), supra, note 30, at para. 99.
84
Id.
85
An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act, S.C. 1949, c. 37, s. 3 [hereinafter “Act to amend
the Supreme Court Act”].
86
Id., s. 1.
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of judicial precedents. Also, there is no semblance of a claim that such
constitutional rules were latent within the existing body of the Constitution,
simply waiting to be expounded. Quite the contrary; the Court recognizes
that as a matter of constitutional law, the Supreme Court and its
composition were not initially entrenched, but that they have become so
entrenched through this enigmatic “evolutionary” mechanism. This is all
very puzzling in light of the fact that the “crystallization of conventions”
theory of entrenchment has been rejected in the Patriation Reference87 —
obviously prior to the adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982 — and that
section 52(3) of the latter now provides that “[a]mendments to the
Constitution of Canada shall be made only in accordance with the
authority contained in the Constitution of Canada.”
While mysterious, this “evolutionary” constitutional change is not
totally unheard of in the Canadian constitutional tradition. Indeed, this is
similar to how Canada achieved its independence from the United
Kingdom: we know that Canada was not independent in 1867, we know
that we are now,88 but we cannot tell precisely when independence
happened. Canada’s independence is the result of the “evolution” of its
constitutional relation with the United Kingdom. This form of
constitutional change is problematic if only because it falls prey to the
“sorites paradox”. The classic paradox can be illustrated thus: A single
grain of wheat is certainly not a “heap”, nor would it be a “heap” if we
were to add another single grain to the first. In fact, no single grain could
make the difference between something being a “heap” and something
not being a “heap”. Yet, we know that “heaps” exist. It is just that the
boundary between something being a “heap” and something not being a
heap is indeterminate; we cannot tell exactly when the grains of wheat
added up sufficiently to form a “heap”. The same could be said about
Canada becoming independent from the United Kingdom or the Supreme
Court becoming entrenched; we do not know exactly when it happened,
we only know that it has happened. While the problem of vagueness is
often of little or no consequence, it is troubling in the case of the
entrenchment of the Supreme Court as such entrenchment entails strict
87
Reference re Legislative Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981]
1 S.C.R. 753 (S.C.C.).
88
Although debates about the appropriate ways to modify the Canadian succession rules
raise the possibility that we may have thought too quickly that we were already entirely legally
independent from the United Kingdom. See Philippe Lagassé & James W.J. Bowden, “Royal
Succession and the Canadian Crown as a Corporation Sole: A Critique of Canada’s Succession to
the Throne Act, 2013” (2014) 23 Constitutional Forum 17.
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constitutional consequences: matters that are part of the formal
Constitution are, and have been, out of the reach of Parliament acting
alone. It thus matters that we know when every aspect of the Supreme
Court was entrenched, in order to determine whether past legislative
changes to the Supreme Court Act were valid.
One may wonder if such form of “evolutionary constitutional
entrenchment” could be used in the future. Are we to believe now that
while the Constitution of Canada is the exhaustive source of amending
procedures, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 does not contain all such
procedures? That is, would the Constitution of Canada also allow for
other amendment mechanisms like the “evolutionary constitutional
entrenchment”? What are the other areas where the Constitution evolved
in such a way so as to entrench what were merely statutory rules? Maybe
the Supreme Court overstated the declaratory nature of the Constitution
Act, 1982 and accepted only something that we could call an “implied
constitutional entrenchment incidental to other constitutional changes”.
In other words, maybe the entrenchment of the Supreme Court was not
merely the product of some obscure evolutionary process, but rather the
incidental consequence of the entrenchment of sections 41(d) and
42(1)(d) after all. But if that is the case, what criteria will be used to
determine whether a rule or institution is sufficiently incidental to an
entrenched provision to become entrenched itself? Or, again, maybe we
all got it wrong and the entrenchment of the Supreme Court happened
when Parliament adopted its Act to amend the Supreme Court Act89 in
1949. But how can a mere federal statute entrench such things without
having the express authority to do so? Indeed, section 101 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 merely grants Parliament the power to “provide
for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court
of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts
for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada”. This is quite
different from the Constitution Act, 187190 that granted Parliament the
authority91 to form new provinces from the Dominion territories outside
existing provinces,92 and that provided that when such provinces were
created, Parliament could no longer alter the limits of such provinces

89

Act to amend the Supreme Court Act, supra, note 85.
Constitution Act, 1871, (U.K.) 34-35 Vict., c. 28 (reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 11 )
[hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1871”].
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without their prior consent.93 Such a constitutional mechanism
effectively allowed Parliament to entrench the existence of new
provinces, but there is nothing of this sort to be found in section 101 of
the Constitution Act, 1867. To summarize, whatever the ultimate
entrenchment mechanism involved here, the Supreme Court Reference
(2014) may actually be more revolutionary than it first appears because it
opens up the possibility of looking outside Part V for ways to
operationalize formal modifications to the Constitution of Canada.
Also, while the how question of entrenchment remains open, the
what question also stands out. As Robert Leckey noted,
… the Court confirmed that the sources of the Constitution of Canada
now include … parts of another federal statute, the Supreme Court Act
— some provisions identified by number as well as whatever might in
future be determined to embody the Court’s “essential features.”
Indeed, by referring to the “role” that the Court has come to play, the
majority judges hint that the Court’s constitutionalized features may
not track directly to specifiable legislative provisions, instead arising
from practice.94

Thus, the majority opinion appears to recognize the entrenchment of
the content of sections 4(1), 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act, not the
sections themselves. In other words, what is actually entrenched is more
fleeting than specific sections, it is a set of rules that somehow now exist
independently from their legislative support. The same logic lies behind
the idea that “essential features” of the Supreme Court are entrenched —
such features have constitutional status irrespective of the positive
legislative — or maybe even regulatory or customary — form. We are
now far from clear demarcation lines. The validity of Parliament’s
legislative action over anything related to the Supreme Court will have to
be evaluated through the somewhat scholastic exercise of determining
what constitutes the essence of the Supreme Court. While looking for the
essence of “natural kinds of objects” like water (H2O) may be one thing,
determining the essence of a man-made institution is quite another. While
any such analysis will have to look at the history of the institution and its
practices, ultimately what is considered its “essence” will depend on a
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94

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE BUNGLING OF JUSTICE NADON’S APPOINTMENT

103

normative judgment about its purpose. All this is not going to enhance
foreseeability about what the Constitution requires.
For a government that had made decrying judicial activism one of its
trademarks, by trying to modify the Supreme Court Act, the Harper
government got quite a run for its money by unnecessarily inviting the
Supreme Court to analyze sections 41(d) and 42(1)(d). The government
had been warned of such risks, but chose to ignore them. But if all this
was not enough for the government, the Supreme Court also turned
section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 from a power-conferring rule
into a duty-conferring rule! Indeed, not only did it restrict the extent of
Parliament’s power to adopt laws on the Supreme Court, but it also wrote
that “what s. 101 now requires is that Parliament maintain — and protect
— the essence of what enables the Supreme Court to perform its current
role”!95 The Court thus found that section 101 now creates positive duties
for Parliament to maintain and to protect the Supreme Court.

V. MEANING OF THE SUPREME COURT REFERENCE (2014)
FOR THE FUTURE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA
The bungled process that led to the appointment of Justice Nadon to
the Supreme Court and the subsequent invalidation of his nomination has
not only unduly hurt him and damaged the Conservative government, it
also has had important constitutional consequences. I have already
outlined a few of those consequences in the previous section. However,
the Supreme Court Reference (2014) will also have specific
consequences for future changes to the Supreme Court. What will count
as “essential features” of the Court? For example, would it be possible,
without a formal constitutional amendment, to declare a section of the
Court uniquely responsible for civil law appeals? If Parliament were to
abolish the reference procedure, would that affect the Court’s “essential
features”? Could Parliament allow the Court to develop and engage in
mediation procedures? While these may be difficult questions that flow
from the findings of the Supreme Court Reference (2014), I will mostly
comment here on the specific consequences of the entrenchment of the
“composition” of the Supreme Court.
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While the entrenchment of the content sections 5 and 6 of Supreme
Court Act ensures Quebec’s representation on the Bench, it also
entrenches the list of qualifications for Supreme Court judges. The
Supreme Court Reference (2014) possibly also entrenched part of the
appointment process, as the term “composition” also refers to the “action
of putting together or combining; the fact of being put together or
combined; combination (of things as parts or elements of a whole).”96
The entrenchment of the three reserved seats for Quebec on the Supreme
Court may certainly be seen as good news in Quebec.97 But this also
means that it will be harder to formalize any stronger role for the
provinces and territories in the appointment of Supreme Court judges.
Indeed, a Meech-like formula may be impossible to achieve now through
a simple legislative scheme.98 This limitation applies even more forcefully to
any legislative attempt at enlarging the Court’s composition to specifically
include representatives of Aboriginal communities and territories.
Another delicate question relates to the possibility of requiring
judges to be able to understand both English and French. A first bill to
that effect was introduced by Yvon Godin (NDP) and passed first
reading,99 but its adoption was cut short by the dissolution of Parliament
and the general elections of 2008. Yvon Godin was re-elected and he
introduced a new bill aimed at modifying subsection 5(1) of the Supreme
Court Act to provide that: “In addition, any person referred to in
subsection (1) may be appointed a judge who understands French and

96
The Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “composition”. The French term “composition”
also has this meaning.
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See, for example, the opinion of La Presse’s Chief Editorialist André Pratte, “Un gain
historique” La Presse, March 24, 2014, online: <http://www.lapresse.ca/debats/editoriaux/andrepratte/201403/24/01-4750644-un-gain-historique.php>.
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English without the assistance of an interpreter.”100 Upon return from
prorogation, Bill C-232 was reinstated101 and was finally read a third
time and passed on March 31, 2009 despite being opposed by the
Conservative-led minority government.102 The Conservative-controlled
Senate adopted the bill on second reading and sent it to Committee on
March 22, 2011. However, the Senate sat on the bill until the next
election so the bill was not adopted. Yvon Godin tried a third time,103 but
his Private Member’s Bill was defeated on second reading by the
Conservative majority on May 7, 2014. While those attempts failed
under the last three Conservative governments, it is highly plausible that
a future, non-Conservative, government may very well want to reopen
the issue. After all, both the NDP and the PLC favoured the amendment
to the Supreme Court Act. Therefore, the question remains: Is bilingualism
a matter that touches upon the “composition” of the Court?
The best way to tackle the issue is to first ask whether the set of
qualifications required by sections 5 and 6 represent a minimum, or
maximum, set of qualifications that could be required by law? In other
words, could Parliament add other qualifications without violating
section 41(d)? A strong argument could be made that sections 5 and 6 are
not meant to be exhaustive. For example, those sections do not require a
jurist to be a Canadian citizen, to be currently a resident of Canada, to
know how to read, to be mentally competent, not to be currently
incarcerated for a violent crime, etc. It seems that a federal statute that
would provide for at least some of those additional requirements would
not run afoul of section 41(d) to the extent that those qualifications
immediately refer to the actual capacities required to carry out the
highest judicial functions in the land. Capacities related to the actual
conduct of the judicial proceedings — i.e., capacity to read and mental
competence — may be easier to justify as they are directly connected to
the act of judging. Criteria related to the capacities of judges to be
considered legitimate decision-makers for the political community —
i.e., citizenship, residence and demonstrated respect for the rule of law
— may be more difficult to justify if they have the effect of impairing the

100
Bill C-232, An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act (understanding the official languages),
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ability of regions to be adequately represented.104 The additional
qualifications that we have suggested here (i.e., citizenship, residency,
literacy, mental competency and criminal innocence) would most
certainly not impair any region’s capacity to be adequately represented
on the Supreme Court. While sections 5 and 6 may not set exhaustive
eligibility criteria, additional requirements could probably not raise the
bar on the specific criteria used by such sections. For example, section 5
could probably not be modified to require membership in a provincial
bar for 25 years. Or, section 6 could probably not be modified to require
that judges selected to represent Quebec must not only have been
members of the Quebec Bar, but also of the bar of another province.
What then of linguistic requirements to be appointed to the Supreme
Court? For one, no linguistic criterion is currently mentioned in sections 5
and 6. Adding a linguistic criterion would therefore not count as raising the
level of qualification already specifically required by such sections. Are
language qualifications related to adjudicative capacities or to judicial
legitimacy? While they may be related to both issues, it appears to me that it
is related to judicial legitimacy, primarily as a consequence of the fact that it
is a matter of adjudicative capacity. In other words, the language requirement
in question is not primarily an issue related to political representation, but it
is an issue that goes to the ability to fulfil one’s judicial duty.
Indeed, as it would be absurd to appoint to the Supreme Court
someone with no knowledge of French, or English, it would also be
absurd to deny Parliament the capacity to require a working knowledge
of the language in which the judge will be called to adjudicate. The
problem would probably be easier to grasp for English-speakers if,
instead of French, all the rules, cases and facta upon which judges are
called to decide were written in Mandarin or Hindi: How could we
ensure that a judge who cannot read all the relevant documents will be
able to decide adequately? Being able to read the decision on appeal, all
the facta presented to the Court, the statutes in their sometimes divergent
linguistic versions, the relevant case law published in either of the two
official languages, etc. could most probably be considered a bona fide
work requirement. Indeed, let us recall that, apart from the federal court
cases, judgments on appeal from the provinces are usually not translated,
nor are court records of the trials. Also, facta presented to the Supreme
104
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Court are usually offered in only one language and, in fact, Quebec’s
Attorney General has a long-held policy to always present facta in
French. The issue, therefore, is not merely one of ensuring that francophones
are “represented” at the Supreme Court, it is one of ensuring that judges
have the requisite capacity to carefully examine all of the documents
upon which they are called to adjudicate.
In fact, the linguistic requirement may already be present in the
Constitution and such legislative requirement may be merely declaratory.
Indeed, an argument could be made that the constitutional principle of the
“rule of law” requires that judges decide on the basis of the law — and not
merely on the part of it that they can linguistically understand. As federal
statutes are bilingual and neither version is fully authoritative in itself, the
capacity to read both linguistic versions in conjunction is required. In other
words, it would not happen that the government would have to choose
between a unilingual Oliver Wendell Holmes and a merely decent bilingual
candidate: no Oliver Wendell Holmes could be limited to reading only half
of the law! In fact, the majority of the Court in the Supreme Court
Reference (2014) itself illustrated very well the need for judges to be able
to read both official versions of statutes and regulations. When interpreting
different historical and linguistic versions of section 5, it wrote:
We reach the same conclusion by applying the shared meaning rule of
bilingual interpretation, which requires that where the words of one
version may raise an ambiguity, one should look to the other official
language version to determine whether its meaning is plain and
unequivocal. … The English version of the text is unambiguous in its
inclusion of former advocates for appointment, while the French
version is reasonably capable of two interpretations: one which
excludes former advocates from appointment, and one which includes
them. The meaning common to both versions is only found in the
unambiguous English version, which is therefore the meaning we
should adopt.105

A judge who is unable to read “the other official language version”
would simply be incapable of applying this binding rule of interpretation;
he or she would not be able to carry out his or her judicial functions
appropriately. The possibility of blindly relying on the legal analysis
of one’s colleagues — or one’s law clerks — is not an appropriate
substitute for the capacity to carry out judicial functions with an entirely
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Id., at para. 32 (references omitted).
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independent mind. Also, it may well be that the rule of law’s “right to be
heard” entails the “right to be understood”. Because the appealed cases
are most often not translated, and because facta are not translated either,
being able to read the original documents in their original language may
be required in order for the right to be heard to be effective. This time,
we could say that relying on colleagues and law clerks for the
interpretation of the arguments presented degrades the right to be heard
to a mere right to benefit from judicial hearsay.
These arguments could probably be supported by a claim that the
constitutional principle of the protection of minorities requires the
Supreme Court judges to be able to read all the adjudicative materials in
both the language of the majority and the language of the French
minority.106 The Supreme Court Reference (2014) could also inspire an
argument to the effect that bilingualism of key federal institutions is an
implied principle of our Constitution, and that our constitutional
evolution has made this “an essential part of Canada’s constitutional
architecture”.107 Indeed, this may be the very essence of section 20(1)(b)
of the Charter.108 The promise of bilingual key federal institutions may
indeed be part of the constitutional guarantee that francophones in
Canada are everywhere at home.
At any rate, this shows how things are now more complicated and
may give rise to unwelcome constitutional crises. If all these arguments
did not work and a constitutional amendment were to be necessary to
establish the requirement that Supreme Court judges must be able to
understand both official languages, a veto imposed by Western provinces
on a proposed amendment to ensure that francophones will be heard and
understood by the top Court would most probably play into the hands of
Quebec sovereigntists. And leaving the situation as it is currently is
unsatisfactory, as it affects francophone views of the legitimacy of the
Court and their confidence in it. Simply imagine how a litigator reacts
106
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when she sees a unilingual judge taking off the earpiece in which he can
access simultaneous translation, knowing that the same judge has not
been able to read her factum.

VI. CONCLUSION
In my view, not only did the federal government act recklessly in
making a controversial appointment to an institution whose legitimacy
derives mainly from the public confidence in its impartiality and legal
competence, but it also failed to respect its partners in the federation.
Indeed, its unilateral modification of the Supreme Court Act resulted in
negligently jeopardizing the necessary flexibility required in a
cooperative federation. This brash move by the Harper government is of
a piece with the attitude to federal-provincial relations that have led to
the Court’s opinion in Senate Reform109 and Quebec’s challenge to the
abolition of the gun registry that will soon be heard by the Supreme
Court.110 Cooperative federalism and federal solidarity require that one
government does not treat its federal partners as foreign states. When
governments forget this, the Supreme Court seems willing to offer them
a reminder in the form of newly discovered entrenched obligations. Such
entrenched constitutional obligations, like the constitutional requirement
of comity between provinces,111 have the benefit of ensuring a minimal
amount of cooperation and adding constitutional protections to one party
or another. But, as is the case with the entrenchment of the Supreme
Court and its composition as determined in the recent reference, such
new-found constitutional requirements may heavily constrain the ability
of future governments to find flexible cooperative solutions to their
mutual needs.
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